Chapter 9

Multiple Roles Continued
Work, Wages, and Closing the Gap

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Chapter Summary
Thomas Nelson and his colleagues (1996) asked college students to make the same judgments you just did for 32 photographed students. We might expect that someone with childcare experience would have the personality characteristics to be a good nurse and a weightlifter to be suited for engineering, but gender overrode such information in students’ ratings, especially from those students with more traditional attitudes about the roles of women in American society. Students consistently and with confidence pictured women as nurses and men as engineers, ignoring other information that might be expected to influence their perceptions. Gender stereotyping was reduced, but not eliminated, when raters were held publicly accountable for their responses and were given information to invalidate their occupational stereotypes (there’s a 50:50 ratio of women to men in both nursing and engineering at the targets’ university). In this chapter, we will see how a variety of social contextual factors, including stereotyping, influence what jobs women pursue, promotion opportunities, and even wages.

WORK VALUES

Traditionally, social scientists have defined work as the production of goods and services that are of value to others, obviously not confining work to just paid labor (Fox & Hesse-Biber, 1984). Globally, people spend about one-third of their lives doing paid and unpaid work, with women contributing more unpaid labor than men in all countries (averaging 2 hours and 28 minutes per 24-hour day; Miranda, 2011). Generally though, in developed countries, if we are asked what we “do,” we commonly define work narrowly as our employment status. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the role of paid employment in women’s lives.

Around the world from 1990 to 2010, women’s participation in the labor market held steady at about 52%, whereas men’s declined from 81% to 77% (United Nations, 2010). In 2009, 59.2% of adult women (72% of adult men) were in the civilian labor force in the United States (Statistical Abstracts, 2011) and 61.6% (72.3%) in Canada (Statistics Canada, 2011). In other words, about six of every ten women over 16 years old in both the United States and Canada were in the labor force (did some work for pay) (see Table 9.1).
These participation rates in the United States vary by age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and the presence of children (see Table 9.1).

Whereas participation rates look at what percentage of a group does some paid labor, another way to look at these statistics is to count how much of the labor force is made up of women. Since the 1980s, the U.S. labor force has been composed of 45% or more women, coming close to 50% in October of 2009 (49.96%), but then backing away from this milestone (English et al., 2010).

Studies of why women are employed conclude that women work for the same reasons as men: for financial compensation, to fulfill identity needs, and to function as competent and productive members of society (Chester & Grossman, 1990). The financial importance of women’s employment is obvious when women are the sole support of their families and themselves. However, even in dual-earner families, American women’s earnings are playing an increasingly critical role, rising from 29% of total family income in 1983 to 36% in 2008 (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2010).

A survey of American college students’ work values showed that women and men ranked Lifestyle (having enough time for leisure activities) as their top work priority, followed by Security (knowing that your position will last) among their top three values (Robinson & Betz, 2008). Interestingly, women’s ratings were stronger than men’s across all 12 work values tapped, with women placing meaningfully higher emphasis on Work Environment (clean), Supervision (having a boss who treats me well), Achievement, Lifestyle, Prestige (others think my work is important), Variety, and Co-workers.

When we look at women and men doing the same job (business graduates), their work values become even more similar, and, not surprisingly, some values predict work out-

### TABLE 9.1
U.S. Labor Force Participation, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ages 20–24</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>69.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
<td>60.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/a</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>76.3%</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With children under 6</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With children under 18</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>69.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Percentages represent the proportion of civilian men and women, at least 16 years-old, who were classified as “employed.” “Employed civilians comprise (a) all civilians, who, during the reference week, did any work for pay or profit (minimum of an hour’s work) or worked 15 hours or more as unpaid workers in a family enterprise and (b) all civilians who were not working but who had jobs or businesses from which they were temporarily absent for noneconomic reasons (illness, weather conditions, vacation, labor-management dispute, etc.) whether they were paid for the time off or were seeking other jobs.” (p. 374)

comes (the values of wanting recognition and making money predicted actual later salaries for both women and men MBAs; Frieze et al., 2006). Interestingly, and most germane to our focus in much of this chapter on pay, controlling for individual differences in values did not affect the gap between women’s and men’s salaries (favoring men).

If we turn our attention to expectations about pay, undergraduate men expect to earn higher salaries, and they value power more and family less than women do (Lips & Lawson, 2009). However, this **intergroup difference** between women and men also includes **intragroup variability**. For both sexes, individuals who valued power projected higher salaries for themselves, and individuals who valued family anticipated lower job commitment. This reduced job commitment translated into lower expected pay among women, whereas for men, valuing family heightened their pay expectancies (possibly fulfilling their breadwinner role?). These patterns lead the authors of this study, Hilary Lips and Katie Lawson (2009), to question whether these work values and pay expectations begin to lay the groundwork for a “motherhood penalty” in actual pay.

This last point segues into our main emphasis in this chapter on the gap between women’s and men’s wages. We start by taking a somewhat detailed look at this intergroup gender difference in earnings, and then go on to the more challenging question of what explanations underlie this persistent gap. In doing so, we tackle many of the key areas explored by psychologists and social scientists in their explorations of women’s working lives.

**THE WAGE GAP**

To gauge this wage gap, we simply take the ratio of women’s to men’s earnings and subtract it from 1.0. If women’s and men’s earnings were identical, this ratio would be 1.00; or expressed another way, women would earn, on average, 100% of what men earned. In this case, the wage gap would be zero, indicating no difference between their earnings. However, if this ratio is less than 1.00, there is a gap that disadvantages women. In 2009, the earnings ratio in the United States was .77 (or 77%), yielding a gap between women’s and men’s wages of 23% (Institute for Women’s Policy Research [IWPR], 2010).

\[
\text{2009 U.S. Earnings Ratio} = \frac{\text{median annual earnings of full-time employed women}}{\text{median annual earnings of full-time employed men}} = \frac{\$36,278}{\$47,127} = .77
\]

In 2009, the earnings ratio in Canada was 74.6% (Statistics Canada, 2011); worldwide, earnings ratios generally range from 70% to 90% (United Nations, 2010).

You may have noticed that different sources report different earnings ratios and gaps, although no one has come close to wiping out the gap by manipulating the figures. The U.S. Census Bureau recommends using the median annual earnings of year-round, full-time workers as the most representative way to calculate the earnings ratio, and hence the wage gap. (I will use this too unless I state otherwise.) The median, or the 50th percentile, is the best way to represent incomes, because large outliers (in this case, those who make millions) deceptively pull arithmetic means upward. Restricting incomes to those of full-time workers assures that we compare similar groups, because women are overrepresented among those...
employed part-time. Finally, annual earnings give a more accurate picture of income than smaller units of measure, which may be affected by variations in bonus and overtime pay, as well as temporary or seasonal work. Smaller time units tend to narrow the gap; for example, the earnings ratio using median weekly earnings rises to fully 81.2% in 2010 (IWPR, 2011a).

There are some basic facts about the wage gap we should understand. First, earnings ratios vary by race and ethnicity. In the United States in 2009 using the incomes of White men as the base (denominator), the earnings ratio for White women is 75%; 61.9% for African American women (72.9% for men); 52.9% for Latinas (61.1% for Latinos); and 82.3% for Asian American women (100.1% for Asian men) (IWPR, 2010).

The numbers easily become numbing, so it helps to put them in some perspective. For the average college-educated woman who entered the workforce in 1984, she has accumulated $440,743 less in earnings by 2004 than her male counterpart (IWPR, 2005). In one year, the average full-time employed African American woman earns $12,000 less than the average White man, which when extrapolated over a 35-year career adds up to $420,000. For Latinas, the comparable figures are $17,837/year and $535,100/work life. Black women with college degrees make only $1,545 more each year than White men with high school diplomas (more on this later). Latinas with a high school diploma earn fully one-third less than similarly educated White men. Now the perspective itself becomes numbing.

Second, the gap has narrowed somewhat recently. From 1955, when the earnings ratio was 63.9% to 1987, the earnings ratio in the United States hovered between 58.8% and 65.2%. The 65% U.S. ceiling was exceeded by the end of the 1980s, creeping into the low 70%s through the 1990s and holding in the mid-70s since 2001 (IWPR, 2010). If the earnings ratio is calculated in dollars adjusted for inflation, fully 75% of the narrowing of the wage gap from 1979 to 1995 is accounted for by losses in men’s wages. This pattern also holds true within specific occupations (Roos & Reskin, 1992). Although parity can be reached by either advancing women’s wages or reducing men’s, few labor activists advocate the latter strategy.

Third, the United States does not rank as highly as one might expect among the world’s nations (Lopez-Claros & Zahidi, 2005). To compare gender gaps between women and men across 58 countries, the World Economic Forum brought together various indicators of labor force participation and pay to form a single measure of economic participation, as well as a second measure of economic quality (assessing opportunities for upward mobility and supports for employment). The United States ranked 19th of 58 countries on economic participation and 46th for economic opportunity; Canada, 7th and 27th, respectively.

Finally, looking at age differentials in earnings between women and men, the news is mixed. The wage gap varies across workers’ age, such that the 2009 weekly earnings ratio for the youngest workers, aged 16 to 24, was 93%; for 25 to 34 year-olds, 89% (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). Does this portend eventual change as the youngest workers mature in the workforce? It might if the gap doesn’t expand as the current youngest workers age; however, for past cohorts, the wage gap has increased the longer workers were in the workforce (Arons, 2008).

**DISMISSED AND RULED OUT EXPLANATIONS**

As I look back over the 30 or so years I have been interested in the wage gap, I am struck by how much the research devoted to exploring pieces of this puzzle has shifted its focus.
At one time, psychologists wrote about women’s fears of success (Horner, 1970) and attributions about success as being caused by luck over ability (Deaux & Emswiller, 1974). Some of those ideas were convincingly ruled out by data; others just seemed to succumb to the shift away from such openly negative thinking about women, which didn’t fit with the changing times. However, through all these changes, the wage gap itself has been resolute, never getting close to going away.

Just for the record, then (and to keep history from repeating itself), let’s start by looking at some explanations for the wage gap that have been dismissed or ruled out. For example, the way we defined the wage gap above (by including full-time workers only) rules out the apples-and-oranges comparison of all employed men and all employed women (who are disproportionately employed part-time). In 1984, 27% of employed women worked part-time, and this proportion has remained largely unchanged (26%) through 2009 (U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee, 2010). Yet when we make the apple-to-apples comparison of full-time employed women to full-time employed men, we still find a wage gap. Making these matched comparisons is often the most effective way to rule out explanations for the wage gap, and there are a few more of these about which we should be aware.

Not surprisingly, interruptions characterize more women’s work histories than men’s, and they can be costly to a woman’s salary (Eliason, 1995), managerial level (Melamed, 1995a), and self-esteem and sense of accomplishment (Keddy et al., 1993). Using our apples-to-apples comparison to explore the effect of job discontinuity on wages, when statisticians compare the earnings of non-interrupting women to non-interrupting men, the gap in earnings remains unaffected (Rix, 1988). Rule out interrupted career paths.

One commonly held belief about women, especially those with partners and children, is that they are rooted and will not relocate to benefit their careers. However, when women and men managers had “all the right stuff”—they had comparable levels of education, maintained similar levels of family power, kept their names on transfer lists, and even moved within the past 2 years for the purpose of career advancement—gendered salary differences remained (Stroh et al., 1992). Rule out relocation.

How about turnover? In an extensive study of women and men managers in Fortune 500 companies, 26% of the women, compared to just 14% of the men, left their employers (Stroh et al., 1996). Women’s reasons for leaving were unrelated to either dual-earner status or number of children. Rather, the best predictors of turnover among women were factors that similarly influence men: lack of opportunity for advancement, job dissatisfaction, and discontent with the present employer. Might we now ask why these job shortcomings were more common among women than men? Turnover per se is not the problem.

Finally, there used to be an education gap between women and men, but it has now closed (and reversed). Following up high school graduates in the Class of 2010, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2011) reported that 74% of women and 62.8% of men were enrolled in college. Still, education is linked to better salaries (see Figure 9.2), and there remain many older people in the workforce for whom there was an education gap. However, when we compare American women and men with similar educational attainment in Figure 9.2, the wage gap remains. (Note that these figures from the U.S. Census Bureau are mean earnings, not medians so that they are inflated by extremely high scores, exaggerating the overall gap between women and men. The last time these figures were recorded using median incomes in 2001, however, similar patterns were documented.)
An apparent paradox of the American labor market is that U.S. women compare favorably to women in other industrialized countries in terms of their education and qualifications, yet the United States lags behind these other countries in closing the wage gap. Economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn (1996) concluded that if the United States had a narrower gap between the wages of high-end, skilled workers and low-end, unskilled workers (wage structure), the U.S. gender gap in wages would look more like Sweden’s and Australia’s, two countries with the smallest gender differentials in the world. Looked at another way, if U.S. women hadn’t expanded their qualifications (by earning higher degrees) as they did throughout the late 1970s and the ‘80s, the wage difference between women and men would have widened (Blau & Kahn, 1997). In other words, American women’s better credentials are keeping the wage gap from widening.

**OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND THE WAGE GAP**

The evidence regarding occupational segregation is definitive and unwavering: Women and men are concentrated in different occupations, thus creating a workforce characterized by “women’s work,” “men’s work,” and some gender-neutral occupations. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2010 lists 501 different occupations and compiles data on earnings for 111 of them that are big enough to warrant further analyses. (Note that “occupations” refers to general categories of jobs, such as “Managers, all other,” which refers to
of all explanations for the wage gap, occupational segregation—the sorting of women and men into different broad occupational categories—does play a significant role in the wage gap.

As you see in Table 9.3, there is no overlap in the top ten most common occupations that employed American women and men in 2010. These top ten occupations for women employed 28.8% of all full-time women workers (IWPR, 2011b); for men, 20%. The top ten list of commonly “women’s work” has been amazingly stable since 1940, and although we have seen women integrate some formerly male-dominated occupations (e.g., lawyer and physician), much of this change is accounted for by the influx of new women workers into the labor force through the 1980s (Cohen, 2004; Sokoloff, 1988). Putting these figures into a more personalized form, for every 1 woman physician in 2000, 83 women held clerical

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Common: Women</th>
<th>Highest Paying: Women</th>
<th>Most Common: Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secretaries and administrative assistants</td>
<td>Physicians and surgeons</td>
<td>Driver/sales workers and truck drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered nurses</td>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>Managers, all other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and middle school teachers</td>
<td>Chief executives</td>
<td>First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides</td>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>Janitors and building cleaners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer service representatives</td>
<td>Computer software engineers</td>
<td>Retail salespersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-line supervisors/managers of retail sales workers</td>
<td>Computer and information systems managers</td>
<td>Laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cashiers</td>
<td>Physical therapists</td>
<td>Construction laborers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-line supervisors/managers of office and administrative workers</td>
<td>Speech-language pathologists</td>
<td>Sales representatives, wholesale and manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptionists and information clerks</td>
<td>Computer programmers</td>
<td>Computer software engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountants and auditors</td>
<td>Human resources managers</td>
<td>Chief executives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The entries in a column are listed in order from the first through tenth ranked occupation. The six highest paying occupations for women that are italicized also appear on the list of men’s 10 top paying occupations.

Source: Information taken from report for the Institute for Women’s Policy Research (IWPR #C350a), updated April 2011, entitled “The Gender Wage Gap by Occupation.”

general business managers.) Of all explanations for the wage gap, occupational segregation—the sorting of women and men into different broad occupational categories—does play a significant role in the wage gap.

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cal jobs, 15 operated factory machines, 14 worked as sales clerks, 10 were nurses’ aides, and 6 served food (Padavic & Reskin, 2002).

Beyond these most common occupations, the full U.S. labor force is amazingly gender segregated. In 2010, fully 41.1% of all employed women worked in traditionally female occupations; 49.3% of men, in traditionally male occupations. To capture the degree to which occupations are gender segregated, an index of segregation is calculated to represent the proportion of all female (or male) workers who would have to change occupations to achieve genuine occupational integration (a state of 50-50 representation in every occupation). Zero would denote a fully integrated workforce, in contrast to an index of 100, which would indicate a completely segregated labor force. In 2000, the index of occupational segregation in the United States was 52.1, meaning that over 52% of the female workforce (39 million workers) would have to switch to male-dominated work to achieve full integration (Padavic & Reskin, 2002). Worldwide, half of all workers are employed in occupations with 80% or more of one sex.

The U.S. index does show some favorable changes across time. After hovering between 65 and 69 from 1900 to 1970, the 1970s saw declines in the index into the 50s.¹ This decline continued but at a slower pace in the 1980s (Blau et al., 1998), and it is accounted for more by women moving into “men’s work” than by men pursuing nontraditional options, both in the United States (Cotter et al., 1995) and globally (United Nations, 1999).² The pace at which U.S. women are entering male-dominated occupations is now decreasing (Jacobs, 2003). In addition, occupational segregation extends within gender to race/ethnicity groupings, and it is not readily explained by differences in the characteristics of workers themselves (Anderson & Shapiro, 1996).

Most germane to our interest in the wage gap, this sorting of women and men into different occupations extends to categorizing occupations as high- and low-paying (IWPR, 2011b). The ten occupations with the highest weekly earnings for full-time workers employ three times more men than women. Of the 10 highest paying occupations for women shown in Table 9.3, women make up a minority of workers in eight (the exceptions being physical therapists and speech language pathologists).

The complement to men’s domination of high-pay occupations is women’s domination of low-paying ones. Overall, occupations with high concentrations of women and people of color fall at the low end of the pay scale (Catanzarite, 2003; Huffman, 2004). In these low-paying occupations, women outnumber men 2:1, and even within these lowest-paying occupations, women make less than men (IWPR, 2011b). In fact, for three of women’s lowest-paying occupations (cafeteria, food concession, and coffee shop attendants), a woman working full-time, every week of the year, would not earn enough to keep a family of three out of poverty.

Employment in different occupations wouldn’t produce a wage gap if women’s work was paid comparably to men’s. Looking across those 111 occupations for which the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics collected weekly earnings data in 2010, there were only four in

¹During 1960 to 1980, occupational gender segregation declined in a majority of 56 developed and developing countries (Jacobs & Lim, 1992).

²This fits with an analysis of women’s labor force participation rates across the twentieth century (Cotter et al., 2001). More and more women entered the workforce in the middle of the century because of expanding opportunities in “women’s work” in contrast to the last quarter of the century, when opportunities arose for some women in male-dominated occupations.
which women’s earnings were higher than men’s: Combined food preparation and serving workers (including fast food), Bill and account collectors, Stock clerks and order fillers, and Counselors (IWPR, 2011b). Even when women and men share the same occupation, gaps in earnings remain and consistently favor men. Even if we try to level the playing field by looking at occupations with similar required skill levels, male-dominated occupations pay more than female-dominated ones (IWPR, 2011b).

This linkage of lower pay with female-dominated jobs is so ingrained that its effects spill over into the entry-level pay expectations of college students. Mary Hogue and her colleagues (2010) surveyed students about their job intentions and expected entry-level pay, finding the predicted gap in men’s higher projections than women’s. The researchers then coded the job each student expected to pursue according to its gender ratio of who is actually doing that job in the overall U.S. workforce. When they entered this gender-typing of the intended job into their analyses as a mediator of the relationship between gender and expected pay, they found full mediation. In other words, pay expectations were muted for both women and men who planned to pursue a job in a female-dominated domain.

In sum, there is no doubt but that the American labor force is largely gendered and segregated and that this sorting relates to pay (both in actuality and in expectancies). The segregation of women and men into different occupations certainly plays a significant, if not definitive, role in maintaining the wage gap. When there were some small declines in both occupational segregation and the wage gap across the 1980s, statisticians estimate that about one-third of the earnings gap was accounted for by gender segregation (Cotter et al., 1995). This pattern holds up within specialties and employment settings (Bird, 1996; Petersen & Morgan, 1995). However, a recent, provocative study finds a relationship between occupational integration and wages across all occupations—such that women who work in metropolitan areas with integrated occupations earn more even if they are employed in female-dominated occupations, suggesting a ripple effect (Cohen & Huffman, 2003; Cotter et al., 1997). Although it is not yet clear what mechanisms link occupational integration with enhanced earnings, these findings argue that genuine occupational integration could have far-reaching effects that indeed might narrow the wage gap.

Moreover, even within similar occupations, our apples-to-apples comparisons reveal wage disparities. But occupations are broad categories of similar jobs, not yielding the same job-level comparisons of women’s and men’s wages in which we’d expect to find equal pay for equal work. Although certainly interesting, narrowing our focus to specific jobs leaves those case-specific data open to challenges about their generalizability. Might the problem just be this arguably quirky job?

Still, case examples that track the wage gap can be important both for the data they yield and for the tools they provide to local personnel who want to test their own work setting. For example, Cheryl Travis and her colleagues (2009) explored the gender gap in pay at a large regional university where they were able to converge findings from two different data analyses and to control in these analyses for differences in faculty rank, academic field, and years of service. The gap persisted, both in fields traditionally regarded as female and in science fields where women were under-represented. Although studies with this level of sophisticated data collection and analysis cannot happen everywhere, especially where sample sizes are small, when they are done, they continue to raise questions about job-level wage inequities.
Let’s pause for a moment and take stock of what we’ve learned so far. There is a persistent wage gap in the United States, Canada, and globally, and it is consistently linked to occupational segregation as well as gender itself (within the same occupational category and sometimes within the same job). We now can refine our question a bit from “What causes the wage gap?” to (1) “Why is there women’s and men’s work?” (the gendering of work) and (2) “What does being a woman have to do with pay?” (the gendering of pay).

THE GENDERING OF WORK

As we did previously, let’s start with what we can rule out. Some social scientists and policymakers have argued that women trade off lower pay for family-friendly employment. Growing up, my parents often extolled the benefits of K-12 teaching because as a woman, I’d presumably have the same work day as my children’s school hours. However, predominately female jobs are not necessarily those that accommodate family responsibilities (Budig & England, 2001; Bullock & Waugh, 2004).

Furthermore, these are not the reasons cited by women making seemingly family-friendly choices (Marler & Moen, 2005). Additionally, women who expected to take time out from work and who actually did were no more likely to be in female-dominated occupations than other women (Okamoto & England, 1999). Probing a sample of over 8,000 U.S. scientists and engineers in nonstandard work arrangements (not the usual regular daily and weekly hours), women were indeed over-represented; the wage gap in these jobs not only prevailed but also was worse than in the best arrangements (Prokos et al., 2009).

Family-to-Work Conflict

Although there is little, if any, support for the tradeoff hypothesis, research on the role played by potential family-to-work conflict is much more complex and hence less clear-cut. The stereotyping literature makes it clear that expectations for the role of workers (committed to work and competent; Williams, 2001) clash with the role of mother (committed to home and warm; Cuddy et al., 2004). Not surprisingly then, we expect family-work conflict to limit women’s participation and success in the workplace (Fuegen et al., 2004). Management students and executives believe that career success negatively impacts family life (Westman & Etzion, 1990), and some women graduate students self-select away from academic careers because they perceive barriers against blending career with family (van Anders, 2004).

Michelle Budig and Paula England (2001) concluded that U.S. women experience a wage penalty for motherhood that, controlling for other factors like experience, cashes in at 5% less in wages per child—a phenomenon they dubbed the motherhood penalty. Further analyses with a large, nationally representative sample of U.S. women concluded that this motherhood penalty was real for White women but had no effect on the Black mothers in the sample (Christie-Mizell et al., 2007).

Interestingly, the negative baggage we saw accompany qualified stereotyping of mothers in Chapter 5 may work to the benefit of lesbian workers (stereotyped more positively than heterosexual women workers; Horvath & Ryan, 2003), even lesbian mothers, who do earn more than their heterosexual women counterparts (Peplau & Fingerhut, 2004).
In their original study, Budig and England (2001) went on to rule out some possible causes of the motherhood penalty, but two remained standing: sexist discrimination and lower productivity. Are family-committed employees worse workers? The research findings to date are inconsistent. Nancy Betz and Louise Fitzgerald (1987) reviewed this literature and concluded that being married and having children negatively affected career involvement and achievement. This conclusion was supported by other studies showing lesser time commitment from women business owners (Parasuraman et al., 1996) and lower earnings among women with disproportionate responsibility for domestic chores (Cannings, 1991).

On the other hand, a study of women scientists found no difference in the number of research papers published by married women with children and single women without children (Cole & Zuckerman, 1987). Another study with women personnel professionals uncovered no relationship between work-family conflict and career progress (Nelson et al., 1990). Having children is unrelated to women’s organizational commitment (Porter, 2001), career salience, and job involvement (van der Velde et al., 2003), and working part-time does not predict lesser commitment (Bianchi, 2000). What may be clearest is that employers expect mothers employed part-time to be less committed to work (Crittenden, 2001). We astutely should wonder about the impact of a self-fulfilling prophecy here.


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An intriguing and consistent finding in this literature is that employed men with employed wives report lower earnings. This finding has been replicated with men MBAs (Schneer & Reitman, 1993) and academic faculty (Bellas, 1992). The literal payoffs of having a nonemployed wife (the “housewife bonus”) fit with theories emphasizing the greater economic needs of sole-breadwinner men, fewer distractions for men with homemakers to take care of the domestic front, and the social acceptability of traditional familial arrangements. These data also converge with findings about the relationship between family and work involvement: Men (and women) who are more devoted to family also tend to be less committed to work (Tenbrunsel et al., 1995). This pattern of what has been referred to as the “daddy penalty” (Lewin, 1994) highlights why the wage gap is more than a women’s issue.

As we might expect, there are individual differences among workers that can overshadow intergroup differences between women and men. The implicit assumption throughout many discussions about family-work conflict, rooted in difference thinking (Barnett, 2004), is that women put family first; men, work. We know that stereotyping is rarely, if ever, so universal, and indeed the work and family achievement scripts of women and men tend to be quite similar (Yoder et al., 2008). Women and men who highly value work perceive greater family interference with work; women and men espousing high levels of family centrality lament work interference with family (Carlson & Kacmar, 2000).

General employment trends make it clear that employed mothers are not an anomaly. Although the media may feature stories about “drop-out moms,” women’s labor force participation, even among women of childbearing age, has been stable since the 1980s (Boushey, 2005; Outtz, 1996). Rather than questioning if mothers are effective workers or expecting individuals to cope with systemic inequities (Blair-Loy, 2003), both women and employers might be better served if we strive to make the workplace work for women and families (Crosby et al., 2004).

One approach recognizes the disproportionate share of household labor shouldered by women (Chapter 8) and seeks to add workplace supports such as caregiving leave, flextime, job sharing, on-site childcare, and so on (see Williams & Cooper, 2004). There is evidence that such provisions reduce work-family conflict (Nelson et al., 1990) and are valued by women (Heckert et al., 2002). Furthermore, supports like eligibility to take family leave reduce the motherhood wage penalty (by as much as 75%; Kimmel & Amuedo-Dorantes, 2004), and mothers’ use of early childcare predicted higher wages and more hours of maternal employment when children reached first grade (Bub & McCartney, 2004). Yet not unexpectedly, evidence is mounting that men who take advantage of family-friendly policies suffer setbacks in their career (Levine, 2000) and how they are perceived by co-workers (Wayne & Cordeiro, 2003). Again, this is more than a “women’s problem.”

Tokenism

How about women who break into traditionally male-dominated jobs? In 1977, Rosabeth Moss Kanter described the work lives of a few women sales managers at a Fortune 500 company. She referred to these women as “tokens,” who comprised less than 15% of their work group and who faced pressures from their constant visibility and difference from the dominant group of men. Subsequent research with all kinds of women doing all kinds of masculine jobs from West Point cadets to lawyers, coal miners, and auto workers showed that these women faced negative consequences associated with their difference, visibility,
role violations, and intrusiveness into masculine domains. Unfavorable outcomes include stress, social isolation, role conflicts, sexual harassment, wage inequities, and blocked upward mobility (Yoder, 2002), as well as increased reliance on restrictive gender stereotypes (Ely, 1995). The simple expectation of pressures associated with tokenism may affect women’s willingness to be part of male-dominated groups (Cohen & Swim, 1995), although this trend may be reduced by elevating women’s status (McDonald et al., 2004).

Some of the most recent work on tokenism processes has expanded definitions of difference to encompass both gender and race/ethnicity, for example, by studying African American women firefighters (Yoder & Aniakudo, 1997), police officers (Martin, 1994), and elite leaders (Jackson et al., 1995). This broadened definition of tokenism highlights both the intersectionality of race/ethnicity and gender, as well as subordination through exclusion. For African American women in these White- and male-dominated contexts, they saw their exchanges with their colleagues as perpetually being shaped by intertwined racial and gender oppression. For example, both Black and White women firefighters experienced stereotyping, but this process varied by the content of relevant stereotypes: self-reliant for Black women (thereby over-burdening them by withholding needed help) and fragile for White women (thereby under-burdening and “benevolently” protecting them; Yoder & Berendsen, 2001).

However, there is more to understanding the impact of gender ratios than simply counting how many women and men there are in an organization. Kathi Miner-Rubino and her co-researchers (2009) found that women’s perceptions of the organization’s climate were strong and important moderators of the relationship between gender diversity with job satisfaction and general health. When the organizational climate is regarded as positive, women’s job satisfaction and general health are both improved by having all or mostly women above in the organization’s hierarchy. However, when the climate is perceived as negative, having advanced women seems to send a chilling message that reduces women’s job satisfaction and general health (with health effects also affected by women’s high gender-sensitivity). In sum, gender diversity along with positive organizational climate—the

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**Box 9.5**

A laboratory study that Tom Schleicher, Tedd McDonald, and I (Yoder et al., 1998) conducted brings together some ideas we have been exploring related to occupational segregation, task-stereotyping, leadership, tokenism, and the status afforded by legitimacy. All groups in our study were lead by a token woman, included all men as followers, and completed a masculine-typed lost-on-the-moon exercise. We created three different conditions in which:

- the leader was appointed by the male experimenter (the control group).
- the leader was trained before the group met, so she had the answers to the exercise, and then was appointed when the group met.
- the leader was trained and appointed—the male experimenter appointing her legitimated her by telling the group that she had been trained.

We measured how well the group performed the task. Even though the second group was led by a woman who knew the answers, they did no better than the control groups. Only when the leader was legitimated did these groups outperform the control groups.
degree to which women feel empowered to change things, are freed from sexual harassment, and feel included—is important to women’s well-being.

“Unsocialized” Women

In Chapter 5, we explored girls’ and young women’s channeling into traditional occupations, and indeed, women aspiring to work in predominantly female jobs as children were, 14 years later, more likely to be working in those types of jobs (Okamoto & England, 1999). Nancy Betz (1993) describes some “unsocialized” facilitators that help women break away from prevailing socialization practices typically pressuring girls and women toward traditional occupations. Women who pursue male-dominated occupations tend to exhibit high levels of agency, express egalitarian attitudes toward women’s roles in society, and feel self-confident. In addition, they often have moms who are employed and well educated.

Occupations may change, but the stereotyping that is part of our socialization may not keep up. Michael White and Gwendolen White (2006) purposively elected to study three occupations, each with similar educational requirements for employees, and that represented a continuum from obviously male (engineering) through neutral (accountant) to obviously female (elementary school teacher). Using an Implicit Associations Test to tap into implicit stereotyped associations and explicit ratings of the gender-typing of each task, they found a good match for explicit with implicit attitudes for the two obviously gendered occupations.

However, student raters regarded accounting as more masculine using implicit compared to explicit evidence. The Statistical Abstracts of the United States (2011; Table 615) records that 92.2% of “bookkeeping, accounting, and audit clerks” in 2009 were women, yet students explicitly think of accounting as neutral and implicitly react to it as masculine. Given that accounting has change dramatically from being mostly male in the 1970s, these data point to a surprising lag in stereotyping which has failed to keep up with the times and which may still influence potential accountants’ (students) occupational perceptions.

Hiring Bias

The opportunity to move outside gendered occupational options must be seen as viable before even the most determined women can make such choices. In studies of hiring stereotyping, raters (typically students or business professionals) review the resumes of job candidates and record their hiring preferences. The general pattern is for women to be preferred for feminine jobs and men for masculine ones (Pratto et al., 1997) and for women and men to be influenced by gender-role expectancies (Cole et al., 2004). For a factory worker position, women candidates were regarded as warmer but less competent (less confident and committed) than male applicants, translating into a lower chance of being hired (Gungor & Biernat, 2009). Obviously, this hiring stereotyping helps maintain a gender-segregated workforce, starting with who even applies for a job.

Not all that surprisingly, the characteristics of job hirers matter, but in some unexpected ways. We would expect student evaluators who scored high in hostile sexism to more positively evaluate the resume of a man than a women, but this is not what Amy Salvaggio and her colleagues (2009) found in their first of two studies. Instead, these resumes were evaluated similarly and better than the resume of a candidate (“P.W. Miller”) whose sex was
unclear. Interestingly, when the applicant’s sex was ambiguous, more students defaulted to thinking of the candidate as male.

In their second study, when students, both women and men, scored high in hostile sexism and thought the sex-ambiguous candidate was female, they rated “her” more harshly. It is important to note that these evaluators recorded their projected sex for the ambiguous candidate after evaluating the resume. Pulling these two studies together, it seems that hostile sexists can control their negative evaluations when gender is obvious. But when the gender they are rating exists outside their consciousness (not being tapped until later), they disadvantage the candidate perceived as female over the one assumed to be male. Although not what we’d likely expect going into these two studies, the pattern of actual findings does fit well with what we know about the subtlety, and awareness people may have, of their own implicit sexism.

Similarly, we might be surprised to find that how an interviewer acts affects how a third party evaluates a job candidate. Reading transcripts of a job interview, the more students liked a male interviewer who showed hostile sexism toward a female applicant, the lower they rated the competence and hireability of the applicant, independent of the observer’s own sexist beliefs (Good & Rudman, 2010). Thus, a woman (the applicant) is being penalized for someone else’s (the interviewer’s) sexism.

Furthermore, this same pattern of reduced perceived competence and less deserv- ingness to be hired appeared when observers liked a male interviewer who showed high benevolent sexism. Because benevolent sexism seems to protect and value women, this interviewer should arguably be more likeable than the hostile sexist some students liked above. However, in this context of a job interview, the interviewer’s BS played out poorly for the female job candidate—making this type of “benevolence” again sexist in its consequences for women.

**Job Queues, Gender Queues**

Occupational segregation along gender lines can contribute to the wage gap only if “women’s work” is paid less than men’s, and indeed we have seen that this is the case. Why is there such a gendered pay differential across occupations? Barbara Reskin and Patricia Roos (1990) compiled case studies of 11 occupations that experienced shifts in their gender composition. A common pattern across these changing occupations can be understood by thinking about two queues: (1) a line of jobs ranked from best to worst by prospective employees (job queues) and (2) a line of applicants ordered according to employers’ hiring preferences (hiring queues). Reskin and Roos propose that people filter into jobs as employers move down their list, and applicants accept or reject offers depending on job availability and where each job ranks on their list of preferences. The result is that the highest ranked candidates monopolize the most desirable jobs. All this seems quite rational. Why hire a high school grad when you can get someone with a BA, and why settle for a less desirable job when the one at the top of a job-seeker’s queue is offered?

Reskin and Roos found few differences in how individuals rank jobs, so job queues are pretty universal (also see Corrigall & Konrad, 2006; Konrad et al., 2000). Turning to hiring queues, however, they found that gender, race/ethnicity, and other arguably irrelevant inputs from applicants matter. Employers’ hiring queues incorporated demographic factors into their rankings such that men were preferred over women, Whites over people of color,
and so on. This sets up a system wherein people with less desirable (lower status) demographic profiles move ahead in the employment queue only when more desirable others are unavailable. Thus, when an occupation becomes less lucrative (or jobs within it decline in pay), advancement opportunities and autonomy), highly ranked workers possess the power to move on to the work everyone desires (Pratto & Walker, 2004), leaving a vacuum to be filled by those lower in the queue. Given this logic, women appear disproportionately in low-paying jobs because they start farther down the hiring queue than men. At its root, this queuing analysis focuses on gender (and other) biases in hiring patterns (also see Reskin et al., 1999).

One important part of queuing theory focuses on what Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1977) in her seminal study of tokenism dubbed “homologous reproduction” (the tendency for work groups to prefer in-group members because of their perceived good “fit”). Inge Claringbould and Annelies Knoppers (2007) took a look behind the scenes at how board members of Dutch national sports organizations made decisions about bringing in new board members by interviewing male chairs of 12 such boards and 12 high-ranking women members. Although many chairs affirmed their support for affirmatively seeking qualified women, how they framed the processes of recruitment and selection reproduced the male-dominated culture on each board. There were no women chairs of these boards, ten of which represented male-dominated sports and two gender-balanced sports, creating a more masculinized environment on each board. In these environments, women largely worked to distance themselves from their gender, prove their “fit,” and thus did not work too openly to support women candidates. So even when there were some women (although 7 of the 12 women were solos), the culture and composition of these boards remained largely male—with dim prospects for change over time.

# THE GENDERING OF PAY

Probably the broadest take-away message from the above review of some of the forces that channel many women and men into different occupations is that the gendering of occupations itself matters. Without stereotyping that accompanies both family and employment
and without tokenism, socialization pressures, hiring biases, and job queues, people would sort into jobs based on highly individualized and thus idiosyncratic abilities, preferences, and opportunities. If, in this different world, a gendered pattern still emerged, we would have a strong case for the power of essentialism. Instead, by noting the power of these forces in shaping the “choices” we all make, we might better argue that the gendering of occupations is social constructed, and instead ask what outcomes are served by this arrangement.

Before we move on to this last consideration, let’s look more closely at the second question we focused on: “What does being a woman have to do with pay?” Much of what we cover in this section doesn’t relate directly to pay, but rather to attitudes and behaviors that may be indirectly associated with pay. One directly related area of research deals with the “salary estimation effect” studied by Melissa Williams and her colleagues (2010). The salary estimation effect refers to the repeatedly documented finding that both women and men tend to make judgments assuming that men earn higher salaries than women. Across a series of four studies, these researchers showed that the salary estimation effect appears in student and community samples, is unaffected by knowing about the real wage gap, and comes up in both descriptive estimates of what women do earn as well as in prescriptive estimates of what women should earn. Furthermore, this effect is best predicted by an implicit attitude that links men, more so than women, with wealth. Thus it appears that money itself is directly associated with men.

In general, we are talking here about an equity issue centered on questions of fair treatment. An arrangement is equitable if people get out what they put in. Given that, at least in terms of pay, if women as a whole arguably get out less than men, then two possibilities arise: (1) women are getting out what they deserve because their inputs are less than (in amount or quality) men’s—the argument made by human capital theorists—or (2) the system is fundamentally unfair in how it treats women—the argument advanced by discrimination theorists (Blau et al., 1998).

Often researchers taking one of these two perspectives examine the same topics, but they do so by asking different questions and/or by exploring different aspects of the topic under scrutiny. For example, human capital theorists might argue that women make irrational choices when they select low-paying occupations. The clearest way to identify this reasoning is to see if you can frame the topic in the form of “If only women … [did what men do].” Throughout the following section, I’ll begin each discussion in this way to see how well that framing holds up.

In contrast, discrimination theorists might argue that women are channeled into these less lucrative occupations by biases in hiring and costs associated with deviating from gendered occupational stereotyping—stereotyping that we just saw extends to pay itself. As you can see, this vantage is more congruent with the reasoning we have pursued so far in this text so that much of the following will explore the impact of stereotyping and different social contexts on women’s experiences in the workplace (harkening back to the logic of social contexts that we explored in Chapter 6).

Self-Promotion and Negotiation

*If only women... stood up for themselves.* As we have already seen, there is a wage gap between the earnings of young women and men who are just launching their careers, and
women college students even expect to earn less than men at the start of their careers (Hogue et al., 2010). Why don’t women promote themselves better and negotiate for higher salaries?

Are women deficient in their self-promotion skills? In their first of two studies, Corinne Moss-Racusin and Laurie Rudman (2010) found that college men self-promoted more effectively than college women during a staged and videotaped job interview. In their second study, women both believed and actually were (as rated by others) less skilled at promoting themselves than at promoting a peer. So women have these skills when they promote others, but they don’t use them to help themselves. Why? This is where the Backlash Avoidance Model comes in.

Exploring the processes mediating this gender difference, Moss-Racusin and Rudman measured fears of backlash (thinking that people who watch this interview might think of me as odd) and regulation of locomotion (thinking of one’s self as a “go-getter” who wants to get the job started and done; sound like agency?). For women charged to promote themselves, the researchers found elevated fears of backlash. Furthermore, having these fears muted locomotion, which, in turn, diminished their actual self-promotion. This backlash activation was not evidenced in the data for men or for the women tasked to promote someone else. In sum, self-promotion, and only self-promotion, raises fears of backlash in women.

Are women’s fears of backlash realistic? They certainly are. Women who self-promote are regarded as competent, but they incur the costs of being less likeable and less hireable (Rudman, 1998). The gender stereotype for women includes modesty, and because self-promotion violates this expectation, there are costs attached to self-promotion for women that make it less likely for them to achieve the desired outcome (getting the job). Also notice the juggling of competence with warmth (liking), that women need (not surprisingly) to manage in these situations.

A parallel backlash avoidance effect exists for women’s negotiation styles and the outcomes these styles achieve (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010). When women advocate on behalf of themselves, they anticipate negative gender-role violations (backlash) and thus hold back on their assertiveness by using fewer competitive tactics—so they ultimately achieve lower outcomes. This chain of effects initiated by fears of backlash isn’t activated when women negotiate on behalf of others.

This sequence of backlash effects for negotiating is realistically grounded for women because of the gender stereotyping attached to negotiating. Following the logic we explored in Chapter 6 for looking at gender differences and their roots in stereotyping, task instructions matter. When the context of the negotiations was framed in the power language of “opportunities for negotiating,” differences between women and men in initiating bargaining were evident (Small et al., 2007). In contrast, when the same task was framed in the more polite and female-congruent language of “opportunities for asking,” this gender difference was eliminated.

Similarly, negotiations that take place in a less face-to-face format (through virtual mediums such as email, telephone, or video), where politeness is less expected, might free women to be more aggressive. Reviewing the findings from 43 studies using meta analysis, the expected pattern emerged (Stuhlmacher et al., 2007). Women were more aggressive in virtual than face-to-face negotiations, whereas the context made no difference for men.
Furthermore, taking an **individual differences** approach, the higher women score as self-monitors (they are sensitive to what is happening around them), the more effectively they negotiate (Flynn & Ames, 2006). In contrast, men’s self-monitoring skills were less strongly related to their negotiated outcomes, suggesting that managing the juggling act of being a woman with being an effective negotiator is specific to women and varies among women.

The bottom line here is that these studies argue that it’s not that women can’t stand up for themselves, but rather that they operate in a gendered context in which stereotyping makes it more difficult for women to self-promote and negotiate simply because they are women. Consistent with this conclusion, a review of the literature on impression management concludes that women and men work to fit more closely with gender-role expectations (impression management), and whereas this strategy is advantageous for men, it is not so for women (Guadagno & Cialdini, 2007).

**Leadership**

*If only women… were leaders like men.* As you may have guessed, this area of research cannot be reduced to this simple opening statement. In fact, Alice Eagly and her colleagues (1995) meta-analyzed 76 studies and found no differences in the overall **effectiveness** of women and men leaders. Indeed, there are some contexts in which women’s leadership skills proved **more effective** than men’s (Eagly, 2007). For example, meta analysis documents that women are more likely to exhibit a transformational leadership **style** than men; that is, an approach to leadership that includes developing and mentoring followers, contemplating new ideas for completing tasks, showing excitement about goals, communicating values, and motivating pride and respect (Eagly et al., 2003). Note how this approach to leadership fits with feminized gender-role expectations and thus is confirmed in the expectations people hold for female leaders (Sczesny et al., 2004). Furthermore, a meta analysis of 87 studies supported the conclusion that having a transformational leadership style is associated with leaders’ effectiveness (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).

So, is there any disadvantage to women in leadership? As you might have guessed, a lingering disadvantage accrues to women when we explore leadership as a **role** that in some specific contexts is incongruent with the gender role of being female (Eagly et al., 1995; Eagly & Karau, 2002) and when incongruent stereotyping is activated. These contexts are not trivial because they encompass tasks that are deemed masculine and settings that evoke agency and masculine stereotyping—in sum, in many of the occupations and jobs with the most prestige and best pay.

Consistent with the role congruity of leadership for specific gender-typed tasks, men were more likely than women to be selected as leader of a mixed-sex dyad doing either a masculine or neutral stereotyped task, even when the female partner exhibited more dominant personality characteristics than the man (Ritter & Yoder, 2004). On the other hand, highly dominant women working with a male partner on a masculine task were encouraged to step up and serve as the leader more often when they were exposed to a female leader model whose presence presumably muted the role incongruity (Carbonell & Castro, 2008). More prejudice was expressed toward female candidates for a leadership position when they worked in a masculine-typed industry (auto manufacturing) as compared to a more feminine-typed industry (clothing manufacturing) (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra,
2006). Even the performance expectations for a team were more favorable when the leader’s gender was congruent with the industry’s gender-typing (Cabrera et al., 2009).

Turning to the link between leadership and agency, college students’ ratings of purported leaders’ masculinity correlated with perceptions of agency (leaders’ femininity, with communion) (Johanson, 2008). Indeed, women continue to regard leadership success in both feminine and masculine industries as incompatible with having close relationships (Killeen et al., 2006). Furthermore, when German management students read about a managerial position that pictured a man, a woman, or both, women rated their own suitability for the job lower than men overall (Bosak & Sczesny, 2008). Not surprisingly, the position was regarded as most masculine when just a man was portrayed. However, the most optimistic suitability ratings, for both women and men, occurred when both sexes were pictured. Most germane to our point here about agency, when the self-ascribed agency of students was taken into account, the gender difference in suitability ratings disappeared. Thus, students felt suitable for the position, even the masculinized one showing a man, when they felt strongly about their own agency.

However, the relationships among role incongruence, agency, and a leadership disadvantage for women, as we now have seen many times, is not as simple as incongruent = disadvantage. Ashleigh Shelby Rosette and Leigh Plunkett Tost (2010) tested the role-incongruence model against predictions from the stereotype content model (SCM) we explored in Chapter 7. Both models predict that businesswomen will be regarded as competent (agentic) but not very warm (communal). However, the SCM goes on to allow that for high-status women leaders, it may be possible to be regarded as both competent and warm, because as we saw previously, warmth is connected with not being threatening, and top women leaders, having “made it” to the top, aren’t a threat in the way lower-status women might be (also see Parks-Stamm et al., 2008).

Indeed, this pattern is what Rosette and Tost’s study found. If organizational success was attributed to the skills of their female CEO, then these women were evaluated as more agentic and more communal than male top leaders, thus achieving a female leader advantage suggestive of transformational leadership. Their follow-up study showed that this advantage generalized to high ratings of these top women’s leadership effectiveness—but that none of these favorable effects extended to women who were middle managers (for whom these ratings were similar to men’s). The overall take-away from Rosette and Tost’s study is that women can benefit from a leadership “advantage,” but only when they are at the very top of their organization (in this case, CEOs) and are regarded as the cause of the company’s successful performance. In sum, then, this advantage, although important to understand, is quite qualified and limited.

Finally, if it is the leadership role that is important, then we’d expect leadership aspirations to be affected by gender stereotyping. Vishal Gupta and his colleagues (2008) explored business students’ entrepreneurial intentions (essentially leadership in business) for themselves after reading one of six articles describing successful entrepreneurs. Beyond (1) a control condition of just the basic article, other variations included (2) implicit references to the masculinity of successful entrepreneurs by describing them using indirectly masculine adjectives (aggressive) or (3) implicit feminine characteristics (caring). Building on these implicit bases, the explicit variations added that entrepreneurs were successful

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4I should note that the industry in which these women succeeded was left ambiguous so that we don’t have the influence of task gender-typing we saw can create role-incongruence.
specifically because of their (4) masculinity and named male exemplars or emphasized the importance of (5) femininity and named women role models. In the final condition, the control article was amended with a statement to (6) actively nullify the gendering of entrepreneurs by noting that successful ones can be both men and women.

The control condition established a gender difference such that men ($M = 3.44$) expressed higher entrepreneurial intentions than women ($M = 2.66$) (compare the leftmost bars in the two graphs in Figure 9.7). Activating the feminine stereotype, whether implicitly or explicitly, made no difference. Both women and men in this condition recorded intentions no different from their same-sex controls. Openly countering the explicitly expressed stereotype, women presented with highly masculinized stereotypes of entrepreneurs raised their own intentions relative to women controls and men muted theirs, showing a boomerang effect. In contrast, the implicit activation of stereotyping, outside the awareness of

![Figure 9.7](image_url)  
Figure 9.7 Men (top graph) and women (lower graph) business students rated their own entrepreneurial intentions after reading one of 6 descriptions of successful entrepreneurs (captured in the 6 bars within each graph). All comparisons within each sex are against the same-sex control group (the leftmost bar) such that darker bars show no significant difference in intentions and lighter bars show a significant difference from the control.  
these readers, deflated women’s intentions relative to women controls and had no effect on men’s. This last finding of no difference between the implicit masculinity and control conditions suggests that the usual stereotyping of entrepreneurship is masculine. Finally, in the nullifying condition, women’s ($M = 2.94$) and men’s ($M = 3.09$) entrepreneurial intentions converged, both by an increase in women’s over control women and a decrease in men’s relative to control men. There’s obviously a lot going on here, so you might want to consult the graph in Figure 9.7. The bottom line is that entrepreneurship is implicitly stereotyped as masculine, and this stereotyping affects women’s and men’s aspirations.

### Mentoring

*If only women… were mentored like men.* It is important in this section to distinguish between role models (who need not be known personally but whose stories can inspire others) and mentors (who actively advise and work with their protégé). Women are more inspired by female than by male role models, whereas the sex of role models makes little difference for men (Lockwood, 2006). As for mentoring, men are more likely than women to serve as a mentor to others, and how men and women typically mentor varies. Men are more likely to focus on career development; women, on psychological and social support (although the heterogeneity of these meta-analytic data call for further research exploring possible moderators; O’Brien et al., 2010).

In a provocative study, George Dreher and Taylor Cox (1996) found that MBA business graduates (including White women, African Americans, and Latina/Latinos) who established mentoring relationships with White men mentors reported an average annual compensation advantage of fully $16,840 over those with mentors with other demographic profiles. Although women and racial/ethnic minority protégés were less likely than their White male counterparts to form mentoring bonds with senior White men, those who did benefited similarly to White male protégés mentored by White men. No compensation differences were found among those without mentors and those with women or minority mentors. This opens up questions about what it is about White men mentors that provides their mentees with better prospects for economic payoffs.

The most probable answer focuses on the power and status of mentors (McIntyre & Lykes, 1998). It seems reasonable to speculate that White men have the strongest links to work networks (thus connecting their protégé as well) and are most likely to be rewarded (thus moving up the ladder and taking their protégé with them). Simply put, more White men tend to hold positions of status and power. The relationship between a mentor’s power and the mentee’s outcomes is clear: Protégés believe high-ranked mentors can exercise more power (Struthers, 1995) and indeed a mentor’s standing in the organizational hierarchy has been associated with her/his effectiveness (Shea, 1994). In addition, the career mentoring more likely to be offered by male mentors may pay off more on work indicators than the more psychosocial mentoring more commonly provided by female mentors (Allen & Eby, 2004).

### Perceived Competence

*If only women… were as competent as men.* If men were more competent than women, this would justify the wage gap. Psychologists contributed to this debate by exploring perceived competence, which we have seen plays a significant role in stereotyping. As we
seen for all but the very top echelon of women leaders (such as those CEOs we talked about earlier), women generally face a tradeoff between being regarded as competent/agentic or warm/communal. In the workplace (especially in masculine-typed settings), agentic women are rated as highly competent and capable of leadership, but often are evaluated as socially deficient and thus open to hiring penalties (Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). In short, there can be a backlash effect when women appear competent— affecting women’s salary negotiations (Bowles et al., 2007), performance evaluations (Brett et al., 2005), and promotion decisions (Heilman et al., 2004).

We’ve already explored some hiring biases, but in talking about competence judgments here, we need to understand how shifting standards work. For example, evaluators shifted their hiring criteria for a police chief position to more strongly value the strengths of the preferred male candidate (Uhlmann & Cohen (2007). When the male candidate was described as “street smart” and the female applicant as “well educated,” raters commonly rated street smarts as more important and then justifiably recommended hiring the male candidate. When these job qualifications were reversed, education took center stage and again the male candidate was preferred. This pattern of shifting standards has been used to justify hiring decisions for both race- and gender-typical candidates (Hodson et al., 2002; Norton et al., 2004).

Julie Phelan and her colleagues (2008) explored the convergence of these two active research strands to see if shifting hiring standards might reflect backlash directed toward agentic women (that is, women perceived as competent). College students watched videotaped interviews staged by the experimenters to present confederate male or female interviewees for a computer lab manager position. All interviewees responded to the same question: “What kind of managerial style do you have?” Interviewees trained to appear agentic emphasized that “…I like to be the boss…to get things done well,” whereas communal candidates stressed getting “…people together, to talk though…issues” and “…to have plenty of input from the people who work with me.” Participants rated the applicants’ competence and social skills and then made a hiring recommendation. The experimenters provided guidelines for the job that highlighted the need for successful candidates to both be competent and have social skills.

Importantly, agentic candidates were seen as more competent than communal ones; communal candidates, as more socially skilled than agentic ones. Replicating backlash findings, agentic women were regarded as less socially skilled than agentic men. Hiring preferences favored the agentic man over the agentic woman, with no differences between the two communal candidates (who were rated lower than the agentic ones).

Shifting standards came into play when ratings of candidates’ perceived competence, perceived social skills, and hireability were examined together. As we might expect, competence was weighed more heavily than social skills for all candidates, except for the agentic woman whose deficit social skills were more heavily considered. Thus, agentic men were preferred because they were competent—the more “important” job qualification. In contrast, agentic women lost out by being perceived as competent but socially unskilled, with compromised social skills trumping competence. For women, then, there is no way to win here: Be competent and lose out to a competent man, or be socially skilled and lose out to a competent man.

Competence plays a role not only in hiring decisions but also in promotion decisions. Here psychologists have studied evaluation bias; that is, whether judges differently evaluate the same work attributed either to a man or to a woman. A meta analysis of 106 such
studies concluded that such a bias favoring men is actually quite small ($d = .07$), if not statistically insignificant (Swim et al., 1989). However, Mark Agars (2004) argued that even this seemingly small bias can have meaningful effects, both for the individuals affected and for an organization as a whole, if compounded over a series of promotion cycles. He simulated four promotion cycles, without and with the small bias identified by the meta-analysis ($d = .07$), to illustrate this point.

Given that each cycle skims off the best candidates, the numbers of people advancing become smaller and the competition gets stiffer. To take these points into consideration, his simulation selected 50% of the candidate pool to promote at decision points 1 to 3, but got tougher at decision point 4 by selecting only 1 of 4 candidates from the remaining pool. Assuming that the selection process is fair and that the women and men in the pool are equally talented as a group and have similar normal distributions of talent within each group, then we’d expect equal numbers of women and men to be promoted at each stage. This scenario is diagrammed in Figure 9.8 as the black bars.

Figure 9.8

Starting with a pool of 500 men and 500 women, the first promotion cycle selecting the top half should promote 250 women and 250 men, but with a small evaluation bias of $d = .07$, 259 men and 241 women would be promoted, resulting in a promoted group that is 48.2% female. As these decisions compound and get tougher across decisions, the percentages of women would drop to 46.4% (at Decision 2), then 44.8% (at Decision 3), and finally 41.9% (at Decision 4). Small biases can compound over promotion cycles, thus putting disproportionately more men at the top and leaving more women behind.


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However, by introducing just the small amount of evaluation bias identified by the meta-analysis, the number of men selected at each point exceeded the number of women, and as the pool of workers eligible for further promotion shrank, this gender imbalance grew. From the initial 50:50 pool of men and women, the top echelon—after only four promotion
cycles—tips toward about 58% men and 42% women. Evaluation biases, although seemingly small at any one point in the cycle, become consequential across employees’ work lives and for the composition of the organizational hierarchy.

**Gender Role Orientation**

*If only women... were more like men.* We already have seen that even when women are more like men (e.g., agentic and perceived as competent), they are not necessarily treated like men (e.g., hired). Even more closely associated with how gender might affect pay is an individual’s *gender role orientation* itself—that is, the beliefs one holds about the appropriateness of various social roles for women and men, including those at work and at home. An example is: “Women are much happier if they stay home and take care of children.” Individuals record their agreement or disagreement with items like this one, ranging from highly traditional on one end to highly egalitarian on the other.

Timothy Judge and Beth Livingston (2008) investigated the impact gender role orientation might have on actual earnings by using longitudinal survey data collected from thousands of 14 to 22 year-olds in 1979 and again in 2007 when they were 42 to 50 years old. In addition, their dataset allowed them to explore the impact of job complexity and occupational gender segregation as two possible moderators of this relationship between gender role orientation and earnings, as well as to probe for some of the factors that might influence the gender role beliefs that individuals hold.

Most directly relevant to our interests, gender role orientation did predict earnings such that the gap between women’s and men’s wages was wider (about twice as large) among those with traditional versus egalitarian attitudes. However, the findings get more interesting if we look beyond this overall conclusion. The effect of gender role orientation isn’t all that big for women—although the more egalitarian women are, the more money they are likely to earn (also see Stickney & Konrad, 2007). In contrast, the relationship between stronger traditionalism and higher earnings was much more pronounced among men. Thus, men who held more traditional attitudes about the appropriate roles for women in the home and workplace were financially advantaged. Judge and Livingston (2008, p. 1007) speculate that: “This implies that traditional men are rewarded in the workplace for seeking to preserve the social order, whereas traditional women seeking to do the same are not necessarily penalized.” Indeed, it is exactly these traditional women and men who react negatively to management programs in organizations designed to tackle diversity issues (Martins & Parsons, 2007).

Turning to the two *moderators* in Judge and Livingston’s study, occupational segregation came into play by linking gender role orientation to earnings more strongly in male-dominated than in female-dominated jobs, and, of course, men were more likely to be employed in male-dominated jobs. Job complexity also proved influential, but more so in low-complexity (blue-collar) jobs than in higher ones. This pattern suggests that there’s more traditionalism among men in low-complexity jobs and that this traditionalism widens the gender wage gap in these jobs where skills play less of a role in determining pay. This finding fits with the facts we examined about the wage gap at the start of this chapter—specifically the fact that the gap appears even in the lowest paid occupations.

This study adds two more important pieces to our understanding of gender role orientation. First, egalitarianism is more common among women, African Americans, the unmar-
ried, better educated people, more intelligent people, and people raised in households that were less religious, where the father was more educated, and in which the mother was employed. Finally, because these data were longitudinal, changes over time (at least for this cohort) could be explored. Participants became less traditional in their gender role attitudes over time, and the gap between women (who were consistently more egalitarian) and men narrowed over time. As we explored in Chapter 5, we can’t disentangle aging from all the changes that accompanied this cohort as they aged. However, we can say with confidence that these beliefs can be changed.

Of all the different areas we explored, this one on gender role orientation is most directly tied to gender itself, and it is surprising on some level to find such direct and clear evidence. A lot of what we have seen here documents the subtlety of the forces that may contribute a piece to the puzzle of why the gender wage gap exists and so stubbornly persists. The people whose traditional attitudes are most supportive of keeping things the way they are (some men) are also the people who are directly privileged by the status quo.

### SEXIST DISCRIMINATION

Trond Petersen and Ishak Saporta (2004) identify three forms of employment discrimination. **Within-job wage discrimination** captures wage disparities within the same job, but this form has largely disappeared in the United States. **Valuative discrimination** describes lower wages in female-dominated than male-dominated occupations, although skill requirements and other work-relevant factors are comparable. We saw this process when we discussed occupational segregation, and it likely accounts for a substantial amount of the wage gap (Nelson & Bridges, 1999). **Allocative discrimination** involves biases in hiring, promotion, and dismissal. Of these, Petersen and Saporta’s review suggests that hiring is the most common site for bias, but other studies point to promotion patterns as well.

Only a handful of studies trace the career progression of individuals over time. For example, Taylor Cox and Celia Harquail (1991) contacted 125 women and 377 men MBAs who graduated from the University of Michigan between 1976 to 1986. They found bigger pay increases and hence higher salaries among the men, even though their samples were comparable in years since graduation, training, ethnicity, seniority with their present employer, and even job performance (participants sent their last two formal evaluations to the researchers). Differences in promotion patterns held the key to understanding their wage differential. Women and men reported similar numbers of promotions, but men’s promotions tended to be more substantial, involving movement up the management hierarchy, as opposed to titular but empty promotions for women. Men’s promotions of substance brought higher pay with them. Parallel research involving a large sample of women and men scientists came to a similar conclusion (Sonnert & Holton, 1996), as did large-sample research with African American and White women and men managers (Maume, 1999).

The importance of promotions brings us to the concept of the **glass ceiling**. The U.S. Department of Labor studied Fortune 500 companies and in 1991 issued a report concluding that a glass ceiling exists, defined as artificial barriers (based on attitudinal or organizational bias) that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization. This glass ceiling was bolstered by reliance on upper management’s perceptions rather than formal tracking systems; by informal appraisal procedures that often judged women according to how well they got along with coworkers, in contrast to men’s performance
evaluations; by segregation of women into staff functions (personnel) instead of the line functions that track toward upper management; and by biased and unmonitored hiring practices that rely on an “old boys’ network,” (still evidenced; Bragger et al., 2002; Elacqua et al., 2009). One result of the glass ceiling initiative was the appointment of a Federal Glass Ceiling Commission within the Department of Labor, which concluded that women continue to hold disproportionately few senior positions and are underrepresented in the pipelines that lead to these positions (Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, 1995).

A key feature of the glass ceiling is its transparency. Promotions are cloaked in a guise of fairness so that presumably women cannot see the barriers that are holding them back. This is not the case for many racial and ethnic minorities, who realize, quite clearly, that their upward progress is blocked by sexism and/or racism. In recognition of this key difference, the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission captured the perceptions of African Americans with the imagery of a concrete wall.

Overall, large-scale studies controlling for a variety of differences between women and men conclude that a substantial portion of the wage gap is explained by discrimination—as much as 55% (Melamed, 1995b). If only there wasn’t sexist discrimination. . .

If there’s so much gender-based discrimination out there, why aren’t women (and men) outraged? Some are. However, some research hints that discrimination can remain hidden and thus go unnoticed even by those directly affected by it. Faye Crosby and her associates conducted a series of studies exploring how comparable instances of discrimination were perceived differently according to how information is presented (Crosby & Clayton, 1986; Rutte et al., 1994). They constructed a hypothetical dataset wherein women were substantially undercompensated despite comparable seniority and organizational level to men. They then varied how these data were presented to students, making the differences inconspicuous by avoiding direct comparisons of comparably qualified women and men and by giving piecemeal, case-by-case data (rather than aggregated, intergroup data). Under these circumstances, students noticed the least amount of discrimination, even though, objectively, women were disadvantaged regardless of the presentational method. Given that few people see salary information that directly compares their earnings to equally qualified and situated others and that most of us are privy to only part of an organization’s overall wage distributions, it is hard to pinpoint individual wage inequities, even when they exist. Failure to notice discrimination is not a valid signal that it doesn’t exist.

Finally, discrimination itself may become self-fulfilling as women’s sense of entitlement is suppressed by low wages. As we saw in Chapter 8, women’s sense of entitlement about who should do housework can affect the comparison groups they choose and their assessments of fairness in objectively inequitable arrangements. Parallel reasoning may extend to the wage gap. In a provocative study, undergraduate psychology students reported their earnings from their most recent summer job and described their expectations and entitlement for future wages (Desmarais & Curtis, 1997). Not surprisingly, women earned less during the past summer and believed they deserved less than did men for that job—and future jobs. However, this difference in entitlement disappeared when the researchers controlled for prior wages. This suggests a self-fulfilling, cyclic nature to the wage gap parallel to what we saw with gender stereotypes in general in Chapter 7.

\footnote{A fascinating short report on “Pay Secrecy and Wage Discrimination” is available from the Institute for Women’s Policy Research, IWPR #C382, June 2011. http://www.iwpr.org/publications/}
women earn less, they expect less, encouraging them to accept less, which leads them to continue to make less, and so on...

CLOSING THE WAGE GAP

To close the wage gap, we might best ask: “Who’s got the power?” This question runs throughout all of the above discussion and indeed may explain much of these findings better, along with stereotyping (Lemons, 2003), than gender per se (Reskin, 1988). Higher-status people are expected to be agentic, to be appropriate for high-status jobs (Smucker et al., 2003), to be evaluated as competent (Smith et al., 2001), to feel responsible (Valentine, 2001), and so on.

Most notably for us here, social status is linked to being male and to doing masculine work. Jobs ranked as prestigious by students are described with masculine traits (Glick, 1991). Applicants with mature, not babyish, faces and men were favored for high-status employment (Zebrowitz et al., 1991), as are applicants wearing masculinizing clothing (Forsythe, 1990). Those with high school as opposed to college degrees were preferred by personnel representatives for lower-status jobs as well as female-stereotyped jobs in an electronics firm (Athey & Hautaluoma, 1994). Evaluations of a leader’s effectiveness were more strongly affected by how powerful the leader was thought to be by subordinates than by the leader’s gender (Ragins, 1991). A clear consequence of discrimination is to disempower (Gutek et al., 1996). The recurrent theme across these studies is that if one thinks of men and masculinity, one thinks of power.

This conclusion hits home even more when we consider the fate of most men who elect to do “women’s work” and contrast this with what we know about women in male-dominated occupations. Although men in nursing, elementary school teaching (Cognard-Black, 2004), librarianship, and social work do encounter demeaning stereotypes from the outside public, within these occupations, they do not face hiring discrimination, and they benefit from structural advantages (C.L. Williams, 1992). In contrast to the glass ceiling that characterizes women’s nontraditional employment experiences, Christine Williams (1992) concludes that men in female-dominated occupations ride a glass escalator to enhanced pay and advancement. Status and power pay off.

How do we bolster women’s status and power in the workplace? It is clear that taking a deficiency approach to women doesn’t do this. When we dredge up shortcomings in women by asking “if only women...”, we are not challenging organizational hierarchies that value some types of work and workers over others. Furthermore, we have seen in this chapter that many of these myths about women workers are based more in stereotyping fiction than in workplace fact.

Rather than arguing that women somehow need to shoulder the burden of redressing workplace inequities, three policy positions have been promoted: affirmative action, equal pay for equal work, and comparable worth (Wittig & Lowe, 1989). Each policy is politically charged, and social scientists have played a role in understanding each of them.

Affirmative action targets occupational segregation and thus seeks to close the wage gap by assuring women’s fair access to high-paying jobs. There are many popular misunderstandings of what affirmative action means (Crosby, 2004). The U.S. Department of Labor (2002, pp. 2–3) clarifies: “affirmative action refers to the aggressive recruitment programs, mentoring, training, and family programs that work to recruit and retain quali-
fied individuals.” Psychological approaches to affirmative action are extensively reviewed in the *Journal of Social Issues* (Skedsvold & Mann, 1996).

*Equal pay for equal work* defines “equal” as “identical,” and it is these forms of readily identified discrimination that have been challenged most successfully through legal action (Pinzler & Ellis, 1989). Although this may redress inequities for some women, the entrenched gender segregation of the workforce we have seen in this chapter works against the widespread use of this approach.

This is where *comparable worth* comes in, emphasizing the role of job content as the critical determinant of compensation (Aaronson, 1995; Steinberg, 1987; Wittig & Lowe, 1989). Jobs are comparable and should be equally compensated to the degree that, looking across a variety of compensable job content dimensions (skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions), their *total* values are equal. Such job evaluation is designed to provide equity in outcomes without demanding identical job participation (without genuine occupation- and job-level integration). Again, the policy is politically volatile and goes beyond the scope of the present chapter, although social scientists have made significant contributions to this discussion (for example, see the *Journal of Social Issues*, Lowe & Wittig, 1989). Closing the wage gap is not likely to be an easy or quick goal, but social scientists can facilitate efforts toward the realization of this goal by considering the contexts in which women and men work and by working to empower women and men in the workplace.

**CHAPTER SUMMARY**

Work is experienced almost universally by women and men, even if we narrowly define work in terms of paid employment. Both women and men engage in paid employment for economic reasons, most of which is not optional but necessary, as well as to fulfill psychological needs involving personal identity and competence. One of the largest and most influential differences between employed women and men is reflected in the wage gap—the difference between the earnings of full-time, year-long workers. A gap of 23% between women’s and men’s earnings persists into the 21st century in the United States. Although no one seriously questions the existence or importance of this gap, there are heated debates about its causes, although some of these possibilities have been ruled out or abandoned (job discontinuity, relocation, turnover, and education). Probably the largest single contributor to the wage gap is occupational segregation, although the separation of women and men into broadly different occupational categories fails to explain why the ones in which women dominate also have low wages.

Dissecting the wage gap refines our original question about what causes this gap into two more specific questions: “Why is there women’s and men’s work?” (dealing with the gendering of work) and “What does being a woman have to do with pay?” (the gendering of pay). Across research on family-to-work conflict, tokenism, the socialization of girls and women, hiring biases, and the theory of job queues and gender queues, evidence accumulates to suggest that social forces play a significant role in shaping the occupational pursuits of both women and men.

Turning to the gendering of pay, we explored self-promotion and negotiation, leadership, mentoring, perceived competence, and gender role orientation, first within the “if
• chapter nine

only women…” framework of a human capital approach, and then more fully from the approach of discrimination theory—which focuses on how the sexist prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination we explored in Chapter 7 play out in the workplace. Across each of these analyses, we saw that pay (and hiring and promotion) truly are gendered, turning out differently for women and men even when women do and believe what men do.

In the final section focused specifically on discrimination, we argued that sexist discrimination subsumes gendered occupational stereotypes, hiring and promotion biases, and prejudicial attitudes that make the workplace environment and access to it qualitatively different for women and men. Situation-centered policies designed to level the playing field include affirmative action, equal pay for equal work, and comparable worth.

Across Chapters 8 and 9, we explored the multiple roles that construct women’s lives, including friendships, romantic attachments, caregiving, and employment. None exists in isolation of the others, nor can any be understood fully without examining a complex interplay of personal, interpersonal, and institutional factors within a broader system of power and inequality.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Institute for Women’s Policy Research. www.iwpr.org

Founded in 1987, IWPR is a think-tank affiliated with the graduate program in Public Policy and Women’s Studies at George Washington University. Their multidisciplinary experts pull together academic and government data to write up-to-date reports on the wage gap and other economic and policy issues affecting women. In March or April of each year, you’ll find a report here with the latest wage gap data, as well as brief and pointed analyses of these and other data. Check it out.


Jacqueline Watts explores the uses and meaning of humor among civil engineers in the United Kingdom, a job with some recent increases in women who make up a small minority (about 5%) of the workforce. Her analysis is very approachable and raises intriguing questions about tokenism, prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, and the perpetuation of occupational segregation.


Joan Williams and Holly Cohen Cooper propose a legal step toward changing stereotyping about the incompatibility of family and work by forbidding discrimination based on family responsibilities. Their proposal offers a provocative structural approach to family-to-work conflict as well as reviews differences between public policy in the United States and other countries that have implemented creative and effective family-friendly policies.


Janet Smithson uses discursive analysis to explore the ways women and men talk about part-time work in financial sector organizations and concludes that this talk is highly gendered, equating part-time employment with women and making it incompatible for men.

Although Tina Elacqua and her co-authors do some complex modeling in this paper, the data come from people in the field (685 managers at a large insurance company) and explore both the explicit and implicit explanations these practitioners hold about why women infrequently reach the top of their own organization. The paper offers as fascinating “behind-the-curtain” look at the glass ceiling.


This chapter by Irene Padavic and Barbara Reskin gives the reader a full understanding of the scope and meaning of occupational segregation.